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Abstract 14 
One Health is an effective approach for the management of zoonotic disease in humans, 15 
animals and environments. Examples of the management of bacterial zoonoses in Europe 16 
and across the globe demonstrate that One Health approaches of international surveillance, 17 
information-sharing and appropriate intervention methods are required to successfully 18 
prevent and control disease outbreaks in both endemic and non-endemic regions. 19 
Additionally, a One Health approach enables effective preparation and response to 20 
bioterrorism threats.   21 
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1 INTRODUCTION 23 
Six in ten human cases of infectious disease arise from animal transmission [1]. These so-24 
called “zoonotic” pathogens, transmitted to humans from animals, are found globally. 25 
Wherever humans live, in both urban and rural settings, disease transmission from animals 26 
can occur [2]. The relevance of zoonoses to human health has been particularly highlighted 27 
by recent highly virulent infections that threatened to become pandemic, with the potential 28 
for high mortality. Such incidents include the 2005 H5/N1 avian influenza outbreak, the 29 
2009 “swine flu” H1/N1 influenza pandemic, and the 2013-2016 West African Ebola 30 
outbreak [3, 4]. Although zoonotic viruses were responsible for these incidents, bacteria and 31 
parasites also pose threats for wide-spread zoonotic incidents [5]. Whilst lacking the global 32 
systemic threat of some viral zoonoses,  these ‘forgotten neglected zoonoses’ have more 33 
frequent local outbreaks that can have significant consequences [6].  34 
The 2005 H5/N1 avian influenza outbreak was the first zoonotic epidemic with high threat 35 
potential to unite global bodies in a network to address the threat of zoonoses [3]. The 36 
recognition of this zoonotic influenza as a potential global threat led to the establishment of 37 
surveillance networks; multiple national and international networks were set in motion to 38 
direct research. A key output of these networks was the One Health Initiative, founded in 39 
2006 [7]. The concept of a One Health approach sees the health of humans, animals and 40 
ecosystems as an interconnected network, rather than problems to be tackled individually 41 
[1, 7]. Key concepts of One Health include: viewing the health of all species as needing to be 42 
balanced; focusing on health assessment and disease prevention rather than exclusively on 43 
treatment; and promoting a strong collaborative between the human medicine and 44 
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veterinary sectors [7]. Under a single operative structure, the activities of both public health 45 
and veterinary services, along with others by extension, can be focussed together.  46 
Employing an “ecosystem approach” in a global context assists in mitigating health risks to 47 
both humans and animals [8]. Indeed, employing a pragmatic, preventative One Health 48 
approach to endemic zoonoses has been proposed to both be more equitable and have 49 
more effective benefits, compared to exclusively treating human cases of disease [9].  50 
Here, we review key aspects of four bacterial zoonoses, all of which have natural reservoirs 51 
or endemic areas across Europe. Anthrax, brucellosis, tularaemia and Q fever are caused by 52 
Bacillus anthracis, Brucella species, Francisella tularensis and Coxiella burnetii, respectively. 53 
These are all currently rare human diseases (respectively causing approximately 2, 105, 155 54 
and 230 cases per 100 million people per year in the European Union/European Economic 55 
Area (EU/EEA), Fig. 1) [10, 11]; however, sporadic outbreaks have devastating impacts for 56 
public health, animal health, and animal industries.  Common salient features of these 57 
zoonoses are: each causes debilitating, potentially fatal disease in both animals and 58 
humans; infectious doses are low (in some cases a single bacterium [12]); and zoonotic 59 
transmission is a risk for those working/living in proximity to animals, in addition to those 60 
consuming untreated animal products [13-16]. Consequently, the bacteria that cause each 61 
of these zoonoses consistently appear on select biological agent threat watch-lists across 62 
the globe [13, 17-19]. The principal routes of infection transmission and human risk groups 63 
for these diseases are summarised in Table 1. Contamination of land is also of concern for 64 
these pathogens, especially for C. burnetii and spores of B. anthracis which are highly 65 
resilient to external environments [19, 20].  66 
(Figure 1) 67 
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(Table 1)  68 
Data from the Surveillance Atlas of Infectious Diseases, a tool hosted at the European 69 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), have been analysed for this review to 70 
discuss disease occurrence and trends in select EU/EEA Member States over a decade 71 
(2007-2016)
1
 [10]. This review discusses the European disease trends and global context of 72 
each disease, along with the characteristics of presentation and the medical interventions 73 
available. One Health approaches to disease management are highlighted, considering 74 
infection events in the context of ecosystem health. A key benefit of this approach is the 75 
integrated assessment of the interlinked challenges of food safety, global health, 76 
antimicrobial resistance and biological security threats [7]. These four zoonoses highlight 77 
important One Health lessons, and provide models of One Health principals in action, which 78 
can be applied more broadly to global zoonoses. 79 
2 ANTHRAX 80 
Anthrax is caused by the soil-residing Bacillus genus. B. anthracis is the main causative 81 
agent, however, recently characterised isolates of Bacillus cereus from human infections 82 
have now been found to possess anthrax-linked virulence factors [25]. B. anthracis is known 83 
for its spore-forming ability, and the highly resilient nature of these spores [13]. B. anthracis 84 
spores are resistant to temperature extremes, drought and UV light, possibly due to 85 
protection of DNA in a crystalline core [26]. This makes decontamination of material and 86 
surfaces difficult.  87 
                                                      
1
 Data collected through The European Surveillance System (TESSy). Data is only available for Croatia from 
2012. 
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There were on average fewer than ten human anthrax infections per year in the EU/EEA 88 
between 2007-2016 (Fig. 1B & Fig. 2) [10]. However, historically, anthrax was a relatively 89 
common disease among humans and animals. In Victorian Britain, anthrax was described as 90 
‘woolsorters’ disease’; a disease experienced by wool-workers that could be fatal in as little 91 
as 24-36 hours [27]. The study of woolsorters’ disease identified B. anthracis as the 92 
causative agent, capable of infection by inhalation. Consequently control measures such as 93 
fans and ventilation systems were implemented in factories “so arranged as to carry the 94 
dust away from the worker” [28]. This demonstrated an early awareness of the risk of 95 
inhaling contaminated aerosols in occupations where animal material is handled. 96 
Most modern-day zoonotic incidences of anthrax in humans are due to bacterial 97 
contamination of skin abrasions, causing cutaneous anthrax. If diagnosed and treated 98 
appropriately this is rarely fatal, and largely non-contagious. Without treatment, the 99 
bacteria can disseminate to cause systemic infection, and mortality of inappropriately 100 
treated cutaneous anthrax is 20% [13]. However, infections occurring through ingestion or 101 
inhalation of bacteria have much higher mortality rates (25-100% for gastrointestinal 102 
anthrax, and 86-89% for inhalational anthrax) [13]. Human-to-human transmission of 103 
anthrax has not been reported. 104 
The level of treatment required depends on the severity of infection and can range from 105 
oral antibiotics to intravenous antibiotics and surgery or amputation as appropriate. All 106 
cases of inhalational anthrax require respiratory support in an intensive care unit. In some 107 
cases, anti-toxin antibodies or vaccine doses can be administered post-exposure [29, 30]. 108 
The frontline drugs for anthrax treatment are ciprofloxacin and doxycycline, which are 109 
usually administered together [31]. Daptomycin, of the cyclic lipopeptide class of antibiotics, 110 
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is being investigated for prophylactic/post-exposure treatment of B. anthracis infection; 111 
results from in vivo trials in non-human primates will confirm if this new class of antibiotic 112 
will be effective [32]. 113 
One of the vaccines used routinely for livestock is the toxin-producing, but non-capsule-114 
forming Sterne strain vaccine. This live-attenuated vaccine (LAV) still carries some virulence, 115 
particularly in goats and llamas, where vaccine-associated mortality can occur [33]. In 116 
addition to veterinary vaccines, there are several options for human vaccines, offered to 117 
those with occupational risks. The cell-free human vaccines Anthrax Vaccine Precipitated 118 
(AVP) and Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed (AVA, also known as Biothrax™) are available in the UK 119 
and USA [34]. Both are derived from sterile filtrate preparations of the Sterne strain. AVA 120 
has recently been licensed for post-exposure prophylactic use by applying the “Animal Rule” 121 
regulations of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) [30]. In addition to this, a live 122 
attenuated Salmonella spp. expressing the anthrax antigen Ty21a-PA-01 is currently being 123 
developed [35]. This aims to achieve a human vaccine that is stable at room temperature, 124 
and can be administered orally over a much-reduced immunisation period (approximately 125 
seven days compared to 18 months with AVA). These features would make this vaccine well-126 
suited for use in response deliberate release of the pathogen.  127 
In addition to the principal routes of transmission highlighted in Table 1, anthrax has also 128 
been found in cases of transmission linked to illegal drug use [36]. The first cases of 129 
injectional anthrax were documented in 2009 in heroin users in Scotland [37]. The outbreak 130 
continued for one year, with fourteen fatalities recorded in Scotland, and further cases 131 
confirmed in England and Germany (Fig. 1B and Fig. 2) [38]. A second outbreak of anthrax as 132 
a result of transmission by injection was experienced by the UK and Germany in 2012, with 133 
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small numbers of cases additionally in Denmark and France [38]. It was notable that the 134 
ECDC data showed fewer cases than were reported retrospectively by Health Protection 135 
Scotland [10, 37]. This discrepancy highlights that data from collated international databases 136 
should be interpreted as general trends, and that sources of primary literature are required 137 
to verify the data. The source of contamination was concluded to be from goat skins used to 138 
transport the heroin [37]. The fact that the spores were able to survive the drug preparation 139 
process highlights the extent of their resilience to external stressors [36]. 140 
Attesting to the resilience of anthrax spores was an anthrax outbreak in Italy in 2004, killing 141 
124 grazing animals, that portrayed a particularly unusual pattern of transmission [39]. After 142 
the removal of infected carcasses, which previously were left exposed to insects and wild 143 
animals, the rate of fatalities decreased. This led to the hypothesis that the pathogen was 144 
spread by flies, both necrophilic and haematophagic [39]. Due to the highly resistant nature 145 
of anthrax spores to low pH, insects that feed on infected animals and carcasses are a 146 
possible vector for further transmission. Some flying insects are able to transmit bacteria for 147 
at least 4 h after contact with an infected animal, e.g. the house fly Musca domestica [21].  148 
(Figure 2) 149 
When taking into account the injectional anthrax cases of 2009-2010 and 2012, it is clear 150 
that environmental transmission of B. anthracis in the EU/EEA is low (Fig. 2). Bulgaria and 151 
Romania are the only countries in this dataset which experience on average one case per 152 
year due to environmental exposure. Two events, in Romania and Bulgaria, were the result 153 
of the slaughter and consumption of infected cattle [40, 41]. In both countries, the One 154 
Health approach to managing anthrax is adopted. Such measures include robust reporting, 155 
rapid confirmation by laboratory diagnostics, appropriate medical interventions, and 156 
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screening and prophylaxis where appropriate for those suspected of exposure. 157 
Furthermore, for animals quarantine, transport bans, vaccination of local livestock and 158 
domestic pets, tracing and destroying contaminated meat and animal products and 159 
disinfection of slaughter sites, processing factories and retail outlets are enforced [40, 41]. 160 
Part of the One Health strategy is also the implementation of laws that prohibit the 161 
slaughter and consumption of meat and animal products from sick animals to prevent 162 
contaminated products entering the food chain [40]. 163 
Anthrax illustrates the One Health challenges of eradication of robust environmental 164 
pathogens. Due to the resilience of bacterial spores, the risk for environmental 165 
contamination from abandoned animal carcases, or even soli-disturbance over historic 166 
animal graves, is significant [39, 42]. Direct eradication in the environment, requiring 167 
removal of vegetation [20], is impractical. Restricting re-emergence of veterinary and 168 
human disease requires vigilant surveillance to rapidly identify cases; vaccination of local 169 
livestock to prevent further disease; and swift disposal of infected animals/carcasses to 170 
prevent contamination of the environment and vector borne dispersal. 171 
3 BRUCELLOSIS 172 
Brucellosis is considered to be the most prevalent zoonosis globally [43], yet is classed by 173 
the WHO as a ‘forgotten neglected zoonosis’ [5]. Members of the Brucella genus are non-174 
spore-forming, Gram-negative bacteria. This genus consists of twelve species, four of which 175 
(B. melitensis, B. abortus, B. suis and B. canis) are relevant to human disease [44]. The most 176 
common routes of human infection are related to occupational contact with animals, with 177 
transmission through inhalation of aerosols and contact with animal secretions [14]. 178 
Consumption of animal products can also lead to contraction of brucellosis [45, 46]. Indeed, 179 
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it was a link between disease sufferers consuming raw goat milk, and later detection of B. 180 
melitensis in goat blood, that led to the recognition of it as the causative agent of ‘Malta 181 
fever’ [45]. Human-human transmission of brucellosis is rare, but has been documented 182 
[47]. 183 
As brucellosis is highly contagious between animals, can cause disease by aerosol inhalation, 184 
and has a low infectious dose, species of Brucella are commonly included on bioterrorism 185 
watch lists [18]. Furthermore, although this genus of bacteria are non-spore-forming, and 186 
less capable of survival in extreme environments than B. anthracis, Brucella can persist for 187 
many weeks in wet soil and ambient-temperature farm slurry [14].  188 
Brucellosis in humans, despite causing debilitating disease, is rarely fatal. In 2013 out of 357 189 
confirmed cases in the EU, 70% required hospital treatment, but only one fatality was 190 
recorded [48]. Symptoms in humans can reflect both acute, febrile illness and chronic 191 
systemic disease, and there can be an incubation period of up to six months before 192 
symptoms appear [31]. Treatment for brucellosis requires a course of antibiotics for at least 193 
six weeks, usually a doxycycline and rifampicin combination therapy [18]. In animals, 194 
brucellosis symptoms include abortion, infertility, decreased milk production, weight loss, 195 
and lameness [49], all of which impact on the economics of farming. Although there are a 196 
number of livestock vaccines available for Brucella species, none are licensed for use in 197 
humans [44]. It is important for disease surveillance and diagnosis to be able to distinguish 198 
between vaccinated and infected animals. The cattle vaccine B. abortus RB51 has a rough 199 
phenotype which enables serological differentiation between vaccinated and diseased 200 
animals because animals vaccinated with RB51 do not make antibodies against Brucella’s 201 
lipopolysaccharide [44]. However, the similar antibody profile generated in vaccinated small 202 
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ruminants (B. melitensis Rev. 1 vaccine) to that of live Brucella exposure makes herd-203 
surveillance for infection challenging where vaccination is common-place. Recently, new 204 
insights into the specific antigenic structure of the bacterial cell wall O-polysaccharide (OPS) 205 
have offered a resolution to this issue, revealing potential for new diagnostic markers for 206 
herd surveillance [49]. Additionally, OPS research is paving the way towards development of 207 
a synthetic glycoconjugate vaccine for use in humans and animals, which would be 208 
unreactive in serodiagnostic tests [49].   209 
(Figure 3) 210 
Between 2007-2016 Greece reported the highest prevalence of brucellosis in its population, 211 
with on average 12 in 100,000 inhabitants contracting the disease annually (Fig. 3) [11]. This 212 
is unsurprising as Greece also has the most abundant population of sheep and goats in the 213 
EU/EEA. An eradication program started in 1975 with the vaccination of young sheep and 214 
goats, on both the islands and mainland Greece [50]. A 2006 report from the UN highlights 215 
difficulties in quantifying incidence in human cases [14]. Italy alone consistently reports the 216 
highest average cases per year in countries reporting to the ECDC (Fig. 3), however, despite 217 
this it is estimated that brucellosis could be over 20-fold under-reported within the country 218 
[51].   219 
In Bulgaria, after a period of 50 years free from brucellosis, the disease has started to re-220 
emerge [52] with the most recent epidemic occurring in 2015 (Fig. 3). This was hypothesised 221 
to be the result of unauthorised import of infected animals from neighbouring endemic 222 
countries [46]. Cross-border transmission of zoonoses threatens to re-instate endemicity in 223 
countries that had previously been declared free of disease. France was declared officially 224 
free from bovine brucellosis according to the criteria of the World Organisation for Animal 225 
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Health (OIE) in 2005, yet through human surveillance, re-emergence of the disease in cattle 226 
was detected [53]. The specific risks of cross-border transmission of brucellosis into Europe 227 
have been studied in the context of transmission-risk from middle-eastern countries, where 228 
there are some of the highest incidences of brucellosis in the world. Turkey has more than 229 
15,000 new cases per year [54], and Syria has an incidence of >1,000 in 100,000 [43]. In a 230 
recent case of brucellosis in a Syrian refugee in Germany, one of the ‘lessons learnt’ was 231 
that gaining a travel history from patients presenting with an undiagnosed ailment is of high 232 
import [55]. Molecular epidemiology tracing B. melitensis in Germany to immigrants and 233 
German travellers identified similar concerns for correct identification of non-endemic 234 
disease [54].To better understand disease patterns, trends and monitor outbreaks in real 235 
time, up to date mapping approaches can be used that harness new computer technologies 236 
[56]. This would rely in cooperative data exchange between monitoring agencies. These 237 
observations highlight that threats posed by biological agents are not confined by 238 
geographical barriers or political boundaries. Brucellosis highlights the need for non-239 
endemic or “infection-free” countries to remain aware of the risks of global zoonoses. 240 
4  TULARAEMIA 241 
Tularaemia is a zoonotic disease caused by F. tularensis. Although there are four subspecies, 242 
only two are clinically relevant: F. tularensis subsp. tularensis (type A) and F. tularensis 243 
subsp. holarctica (type B). Whilst type A strains cause the most severe disease, with an 244 
infectious dose of fewer than ten organisms, natural reservoirs are restricted to North 245 
America [15, 57]. F. tularensis subsp. holarctica is relevant in Europe, with prevalence across 246 
the Northern hemisphere, and an infectious dose of 10-50 bacteria [15, 31]. Clinical 247 
presentation of tularaemia in humans is highly dependent on the route of transmission, in a 248 
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similar manner to cutaneous/gastrointestinal anthrax (Table 1). Ingestion of food or water 249 
contaminated with F. tularensis causes oropharyngeal disease [16]. Blood contact with 250 
infected animals from scratches/cuts or insect bites more often results directly in glandular 251 
presentation, causing swelling and ulcers. Finally, transmission through inhalation of 252 
aerosols in contaminated dust leads to a pneumonic presentation [16]. The latter two 253 
modes have the highest risk of environmental transmission for hunters and farmers. 254 
Pneumonic tularaemia is also the most relevant disease presentation in the context of 255 
bioterrorism [17]. The incubation period ranges from 1-14 days, and is generally 2-5 days 256 
[57]. Without treatment, both glandular and oropharyngeal infections can persist for weeks 257 
or months and may progress to the more serious and potentially fatal pneumonic or 258 
septicaemic tularaemia [57]. 259 
As with inhalational anthrax, due to the potential severity of symptoms and risk of mortality, 260 
a dual antibiotic approach is recommended for treatment of pneumonic tularaemia, for 261 
example gentamicin and ciprofloxacin [31]. In 2013, information on the outcome of 262 
confirmed tularaemia cases in Europe (covering almost 50% of reported cases), showed that 263 
approximately 52% of cases required hospital treatment, however no deaths were reported 264 
[48]. Due to the nature of the undulating fever associated with tularaemia, it is expected 265 
that the number of cases will be under-reported [58]. No human vaccine for tularaemia is 266 
licenced yet in the EU/EEA. A live vaccine strain (LVS) was produced in the Soviet Union 267 
through serial passaging, from F. tularensis subsp. holarctica, this has been in clinical trials, 268 
but currently safety and efficacy concerns have prohibited licensure [57, 59]. A modern LAV 269 
showing promise is based on Francisella novicida, a bacterial species avirulent in healthy 270 
humans [60]. Further to this, a new vaccine strategy is also in development, employing a 271 
glycoconjugate subunit vaccine, in a similar approach to that being used for brucellosis [61].  272 
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 (Figure 4) 273 
Across all EU/EEA Member States, Sweden, Finland and Norway had the highest reported 274 
prevalence of tularaemia in their populations between 2008-2016 (Figs. 1A and 4). Sweden 275 
alone was responsible for 43% of the average yearly cases of tularaemia in the EU/EEA, with 276 
on average four in every 100,000 people reporting a case each year [10, 11].  F. tularensis 277 
subsp. holarctica is able to infect a range of animal hosts: recently identified wild hosts 278 
include the red fox (Vulpes vulpes), wild boar (Sus scrofa) and raccoon dog (Nyctereutes 279 
procyonoides). However, most tularaemia surveillance in European animals comes from 280 
recording dead/diseased farmed rabbits/hares [16]. Infection of such forest mammals, and 281 
even fish, with F. tularensis subsp. holarctica leads to a risk of zoonotic transmission for any 282 
activities which involve contact with wildlife in endemic areas, most notably hunting (Table 283 
1) [62]. The peaks of tularaemia outbreaks in the EU occur over the end of the summer, 284 
coinciding with the peak in mosquito populations [16]. It is therefore widely accepted that 285 
mosquitos are responsible for the transmission of F. tularensis subsp. holarctica between 286 
animals, and to humans (Table 1). A single contaminated water source can lead to 287 
mosquito-borne transmission of tularaemia [15, 22]. Furthermore, as the taiga forest covers 288 
the three European countries with highest reported prevalence of tularaemia, it is not 289 
surprising that they share natural sources for infection. Therefore, the relationship between 290 
humans and animals with parasites and vectors plays a key role in the spread of infection 291 
[63].  292 
The survival and propagation of F. tularensis subsp. holarctica in natural fresh and brackish 293 
water has been well studied, however, there have been fewer studies on the environmental 294 
survival of F. tularensis subsp. tularensis [15, 62]. An unusual outbreak of tularaemia on an 295 
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island off the coast of Cape Cod, USA led to establishing that F. tularensis subsp. tularensis 296 
can indeed survive in brackish water [64]. This outbreak on Martha’s Vineyard, spanning 297 
from 2000-2008, was unusual due to the skew of disease presentation to pneumonic, rather 298 
than the glandular presentation associated with bites from parasites, and contamination of 299 
skin wounds [23]. Two thirds of the 90 reported cases displayed pneumonic symptoms. The 300 
observation of pneumonic presentation led to investigations to track the source of infection, 301 
to ensure that this was a natural event and not bioterrorism [17]. However, no 302 
environmental samples were positive for either of the disease-causing species of F. 303 
tularensis [23, 64]. It remains unknown what the true reservoir for F. tularensis subsp. 304 
tularensis is on Martha’s vineyard; without definition of this, intervention methods are 305 
limited. However, links have been made with landscaping activities increasing likelihood for 306 
infection, thus is it advised to wear personal protective equipment e.g. masks [23].  307 
The management of tularaemia outbreaks highlights the need for human, animal and whole 308 
ecosystem surveillance systems to achieve an efficient One Health approach [6, 7, 58]. 309 
Understanding the source of infection is important for deployment of the most effective 310 
response to minimise disease. For example, if a parasite/rodent source is suspected, 311 
methods for pest control would be advised, however, if the source was a water system then 312 
disease management should focus on personal protection, for example vaccination [65]. In 313 
addition to the need of vaccines for ecosystem health in endemic areas, vaccine 314 
development strategies are also important to address F. tularensis as a potential bioterror 315 
agent [17].  316 
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5 Q FEVER 317 
Query fever, or Q fever as it is more commonly known, is the zoonosis caused by C. burnetii, 318 
an obligate intracellular bacterium that is globally prevalent (except in New Zealand) [66]. C. 319 
burnetii, similar to F. tularensis, infects a wide range of species, including terrestrial 320 
mammals such as cats and dogs, and even aquatic mammals [66, 67]. However, Q fever is of 321 
particular economic significance in ruminants, such as cows, sheep and goats [68]. In such 322 
animals, symptoms are similar to those of brucellosis, with spontaneous abortion of 323 
pregnancies being the main clinical symptom. Again, this causes a substantial economic 324 
impact for animal industries [68]. The material shed from animal infections (e.g. abortive 325 
material, milk, faeces and urine) contaminates dirt and dust in the environment with C. 326 
burnetii. Here, C. burnetii cells adapt to the harsh environment outside of a host by adopting 327 
a highly resilient spore-like state [66]. These highly resistant cells behave similarly to anthrax 328 
spores, remaining viable for years and easily becoming aerosolised in wind, for example in 329 
dust clouds, where they can spread to new areas and infect new hosts [69].  330 
Inhalation of bacteria is the most common route of Q fever transmission to humans. As few 331 
as 1-10 aerosolised C. burnetii cells can result in zoonotic transmission, therefore occupation 332 
is a key risk-factor for disease; individuals at highest risk of Q fever exposure are farmers, 333 
abattoir workers and vets [12, 70]. In Australia, prior to an increase in Q-fever vaccination as 334 
many as 60% of meat and agricultural workers were seropositive after 25 years in the 335 
industry [70]. In addition to occupational risks, the presence of C. burnetii in ruminant milk, 336 
as with Brucella, also poses a risk for disease transmission [71-74] (Table 1). Humans 337 
generally present with acute infections, causing symptoms of an undifferentiated febrile 338 
illness after an incubation period of 2-40 days (most commonly 18-21 days) [31, 75]. 339 
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However, patients can develop life-changing complications from persistent focalised 340 
infections, such as hepatitis, chronic fatigue, and endocarditis [76]. A quick and accurate 341 
diagnosis for Q fever is important as although little is known about the development of 342 
persistent infections, and post–Q fever fatigue, the severity of the initial infection is a known 343 
risk factor [66]. Doxycycline, often administered as a monotherapy, is the primary antibiotic 344 
used in the treatment of acute Q fever in humans, and swift administration should minimise 345 
complications [31, 66]. For animals, a whole-cell inactivated vaccine, Coxevac, can be used 346 
to prevent infection, and has been shown to reduce shedding of bacteria when applied in 347 
combination with antibiotic therapy for dairy herds already affected by Q fever [77].  While 348 
a similar formalin-inactivated whole-cell vaccine is available for human use in Australia, 349 
there is currently no Q fever vaccine licensed in the UK/EU/US, but research programs are 350 
on-going [78]. 351 
(Figure 5) 352 
Between 2007-2010 the Netherlands experienced the biggest Q fever epidemic in recorded 353 
history (Fig. 5). Over 4,000 human cases were confirmed during this outbreak; additionally, 354 
over 50,000 dairy goats were culled [79]. A cross-sectional population-based serological 355 
survey later confirmed that airborne bacteria carried on the wind from infected goat farms 356 
was responsible for zoonotic transmission [69]. Real-time PCR for acute-phase diagnostics 357 
was pivotal to the outbreak assessment, contributing to the ability to confirm a Q fever 358 
diagnosis in cases where serology was inconclusive [80]. Directly following the outbreak only 359 
six fatalities were reported but by May 2016 the death toll had risen to 74 [81]. The rise to 360 
74 by 2016 reflects that Q fever infections can remain dormant, with persistent focalised 361 
infections causing symptoms long after exposure [76, 82]. As a result of the epidemic, 362 
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seroprevalence to C. burnetii antibodies in the general population of the Netherlands rose 363 
from 2.4% in 2006 to 6.1% in 2015 [69]. One key output of the Netherlands epidemic was 364 
the establishment of a national zoonosis structure with a monthly signalling forum [68].  365 
In the Netherlands, after the onset of the large epidemic, in December 2009 government 366 
measures were put in place to vaccinate all dairy goats and sheep, and to test and cull 367 
pregnant animals testing positive for C. burnetii. One of the methods for detection was the 368 
presence or absence of C. burnetii DNA in bulk tank milk (BTM) tested by PCR [72]. However, 369 
up to nine days after immunisation, vaccine-derived C. burnetii DNA can be detected in the 370 
milk of dairy goats which have not had live pathogen exposure. As a results of this a two-371 
week post-vaccination interval was introduced to the test-and-cull control measures, in 372 
order to avoid unnecessary culling due to vaccine-derived false-positive detection [71].  373 
Globally, in French Guiana acute Q fever is responsible for the highest proportion of 374 
community-acquired pneumonia worldwide [83], followed by Canada, Northern Spain, 375 
Croatia and the Netherlands [66].  In Cayenne, French Guiana, Q fever is a hyperendemic 376 
disease, with the incidence of cases in 2005 reaching 150 cases per 100,000 inhabitants [84]. 377 
A retrospective cohort study recently linked two independent risk factors to a 2013 378 
epidemic in Cayenne: cleaning the house; and carrying a three-toed sloth. Both of these 379 
activities correlate to inhalational disease acquisition [85].  380 
In 2013, Hungary experienced a Q fever outbreak, albeit on a smaller scale (Fig. 5). The 381 
source of this epidemic was tracked to a flock of Merino sheep, where, as with the previous 382 
Netherlands epidemic, dried contaminated material was carried by the wind causing human 383 
infections by inhalation [86]. The epidemic was resolved after all manure from the infected 384 
farm was eliminated and the farm disinfected. Furthermore, for the management of C. 385 
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burnetii infection spread within a herd, good farm practices such as regular litter-cleaning 386 
have been recommended as simple measures prior to whole-farm disinfection [87]. 387 
Generally, Q fever infection in humans is controllable by good hygiene practices when 388 
dealing with animals, particularly ruminants. From a One Health perspective, Q fever 389 
represents one example of a wide range of conditions that cause febrile disease. Rapid 390 
diagnostics that can differentiate these (often rare) underlying diseases offer the 391 
opportunity to avoid unnecessary antimicrobial use and to take early, specific actions to 392 
prevent development of disease [24, 80]. Surveillance of enzootic pathogens using 393 
seroprevalence in livestock assists in informing the risk of transmission of zoonoses to 394 
humans.   395 
6 DISCUSSION/ CONCLUSIONS 396 
Bacterial zoonoses are often omitted from discussions on priority global zoonoses. 397 
Nevertheless, they remain relevant to One Health while reservoirs for disease remain 398 
prevalent in areas with endemic zoonoses [9]. Anthrax is enzootic to Eastern Europe, with 399 
consistent yearly cases of zoonotic transmission in Bulgaria and Romania (Fig. 2) [10]. While 400 
brucellosis eradication programmes are being employed across Europe, the disease remains 401 
endemic in both Greece and Italy [50, 51]. However, the main threat for brucellosis re-402 
emergence in Europe arises from countries such as Syria, which has an incidence 100-times 403 
greater than that of endemic European countries [43]. Sweden has the highest endemic 404 
prevalence of F. tularensis subsp. holarctica, with 43% of tularaemia cases reported to the 405 
ECDC occurring there. For a zoonosis like this, where >50% of cases can require hospital 406 
treatment, applying One Health control and prevention measures in an eco-system 407 
approach offers an attractive model for lessening the economic burden of disease [9]. 408 
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Whilst endemic globally, it was the Q fever epidemic experienced by the Netherlands that 409 
drew global attention to the disease [79]. The networks in place for a One Health approach 410 
to endemic disease management apply also in response to epidemics [88]; analysis here 411 
shows that 67% of all Q fever cases reported to the ECDC between 2008-2010 occurred in 412 
the Netherlands (the latter three years of the 2007-2010 epidemic) (Fig. 5) [10]. However, in 413 
the six years following, only 5% of the total cases across the EU/EEA were of Dutch origin, 414 
showing an effectively maintained response.  415 
One Health intervention methods include surveillance, medical interventions (post-exposure 416 
therapeutics and prophylactic vaccines), and sanitation. The case for employing One Health 417 
initiatives, and engaging communities to partake in them, clearly highlights the potential for 418 
much improved efficacy, and more equitable health and livelihood benefits [9]. In addition 419 
to monitoring and controlling endemic disease epidemics, it is also important to keep the 420 
global conversation updated on bacterial zoonoses due to the potential threat of their 421 
malicious misuse. 422 
Surveillance requires accurate and reliable reporting mechanisms, so that appropriate 423 
points for intervention can be recognised [88]. Maintaining reliable information on 424 
international prevalence (both human and animal), and detailed case histories for infection 425 
incidence is paramount to One Health. These will include national reporting structures, such 426 
as that set-up after the Q fever outbreak in the Netherlands [68]. International tools for 427 
collating data, such as The ECDC Surveillance Atlas of Infectious Diseases [10] offer a 428 
broader perspective, and information for professionals in all sectors working towards One 429 
Health. 430 
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Diagnostics play a key role in disease surveillance. Misdiagnosis results in inappropriate 431 
treatment, or missed opportunities to prevent further disease transmission. The zoonoses 432 
discussed here often present as undifferentiated febrile illnesses, and so a detailed history is 433 
key to diagnosis. More common ailments with similar symptoms will be initially suspected, 434 
and diagnosis may be missed altogether in self-limiting cases. While algorithm tools for 435 
disease diagnosis and management have been developed to aid medical professionals in 436 
diagnosis of zoonoses [89], there is a clear need for accurate and sensitive point-of-care 437 
diagnostic tests [9]. Emerging technologies such as high throughput sequencing and 438 
semiconductor genome analysis offer the potential for diagnosis within hours [90]. This will 439 
be of particular benefit for zoonoses where development to persistent or chronic disease is 440 
a risk [57, 76].   441 
Medical interventions, including post-exposure therapeutics such as antibiotics are essential 442 
especially for human treatment [31]. For diseased animals, post-exposure therapy is often 443 
not a viable approach, due to the associated costs, risk of further transmission, and 444 
virulence of these infections potentially causing death before culling. Instead, One Health 445 
necessitates a focus on prevention, and requires cheap, effective and readily deployable 446 
prophylaxis methods, such as veterinary and human vaccines [9]. Current vaccine research 447 
directives are progressing away from LAVs or whole cell killed vaccines. Such approaches are 448 
using reverse vaccinology, subunit vaccines and conjugate vaccines (e.g. the Salmonella-449 
Ty21a-PA-01 anthrax toxin conjugate vaccine, glycoconjugate vaccines for brucellosis and 450 
tularaemia, and epitope-selected subunit vaccines for Q fever [35, 49, 61, 78]). These 451 
minimise safety risks (such as potential animal toxicity of the anthrax Sterne strain vaccine), 452 
and enable more effective herd surveillance methods. The prospect of room-temperature-453 
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stable vaccines (e.g. anthrax toxin-conjugate vaccine [35]) offers advantages for public 454 
health and veterinary preparedness, as well as outbreak and bio-terrorism management.  455 
Sanitation such as basic infection control measures should be taken in areas of endemic 456 
zoonoses, including vaccination where appropriate, good hygiene practices and the use of 457 
appropriate personal protective equipment (especially where exposure to aerosols is a risk) 458 
[23, 24]. In Australia, it is recommended that clothing potentially contaminated with C. 459 
burnetii should not be washed in the presence of un-vaccinated individuals [24]. Farm 460 
sanitation is also important, as shown for Brucella which can survival in farm slurry [14], and 461 
the recommendation for regular cleaning and incineration of litter to prevent the spread of 462 
Q fever in a herd [87].  463 
Bioterror classifications set by the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 464 
(U.S. CDC) classify anthrax and tularaemia as Category A agents, the highest priority [91]. 465 
This is due to their transmissibility, potential for high mortality, potential for major impact 466 
to public health, potential to cause public panic and social disruption, and the requirement 467 
of special action for public health preparedness. Brucellosis and Q fever appear in Category 468 
B where, despite high infectiousness, mortality rates are lower [91]. One key aspect to 469 
disease threat categorisation is whether the disease exists naturally or is endemic. For 470 
example, in the UK, any confirmed case of a non-endemic biothreat should be assumed to 471 
be the result of a deliberate release until proven otherwise [31]. This is the case for 472 
pulmonary anthrax and tularaemia, in addition to other zoonoses such as smallpox, plague, 473 
glanders, Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE) or viral haemorrhagic fever (VHF). 474 
Appreciation of an area’s endemic pathogens, in the context of global distribution, is 475 
therefore of considerable importance to threat assessment [88]. Anthrax is possibly the 476 
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most high profile modern biological threat agent, due to its weaponization and use in the 477 
late 20
th
 century, most notably the intentional contamination of postal letters in 2001, 478 
resulting in five mortalities [92]. There has been speculative evidence of C. burnetii used 479 
maliciously in Europe in the past, including an outbreak of Q fever among army troops 480 
during World War II [93]. Indeed, F. tularensis was also suspected to have been deployed 481 
maliciously during World War II [17]. Used as weapons,  Brucella species (notably B. suis),  F. 482 
tularensis subsp. holarctica and C. burnetii would have low mortality rates, but carry the 483 
potential to debilitate large numbers of people and animals, contaminate the environment, 484 
and disrupt animal industries [93, 94]. 485 
While transmission of zoonotic disease in the EU/EEA is most relevant to those with 486 
occupational health risks, global threats to human, animal and environmental health 487 
security do remain from cross-border transmission, environmentally resilient pathogens and 488 
the potential for biological agent weaponization. The most poignant risk to global health is 489 
the lack of disease awareness, and ignorance of the interlinked connections between global 490 
health, food safety, antimicrobial resistance and biological security threats. Thus employing 491 
a One Health approach is vital, and local and international information-sharing on 492 
surveillance, control and prevention measures is of the utmost importance to enabling One 493 
Health for all zoonoses. 494 
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Figure 1: Reported cases of anthrax, brucellosis, tularaemia and Q fever in the EU/EEA 736 
between 2008-2016. A) Maps of the EU/EEA colour-coded by the total number of cases of 737 
each zoonosis reported where data is available. Data on Q fever occurrence in Italy is not 738 
available for 2008-2015, therefore it is omitted here. B) Reported annual cases of 739 
brucellosis, Q fever and tularaemia; Anthrax is omitted here due to the much smaller 740 
number of cases (on average fewer than 10 per year). Dataset provided by ECDC based on 741 
data provided by WHO and Ministries of Health from the affected countries [10]. Figure 742 
generated using mapchart.net (https://mapchart.net/europe.html), GraphPad Prism v.6.0.1 743 
and gravit.io (https://gravit.io/).  744 
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Figure 2: Number of cases of anthrax reported each year in the EU/EEA.  Data is shown for 745 
every country with at least one case reported between 2007-2016. Peaks in cases reported 746 
to the ECDC have been attributed to injectional anthrax, caused by the use of contaminated 747 
heroin. 14 cases were reported to the ECDC in 2009 and 32 in 2010. It should be noted that 748 
there is a discrepancy between the ECDC data and original literature reported in December 749 
2011 for the injectional anthrax outbreak, reflecting under-reporting by approximately 20% 750 
in the data shown here [37]. 2012 then saw a second episode of injectional anthrax cases in 751 
the UK and Germany again, with an additional report in France and two in Denmark. Dataset 752 
provided by ECDC based on data provided by WHO and Ministries of Health from the 753 
affected countries [10]. Figure generated using GraphPad Prism v.6.0.1.  754 
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Figure 3: Number of cases of brucellosis reported each year in the EU/EEA. Data is shown 755 
for every country with >50 total cases reported between 2007-2016. In most European 756 
Member States, the notification of brucellosis in humans is mandatory. The exceptions are 757 
the UK (where only animal infection is notifiable), Belgium, and Denmark. Voluntary 758 
surveillance systems have full national coverage in the former two, but in Denmark 759 
brucellosis remains non-notifiable, with no surveillance system in place [48]. Brucellosis 760 
prevalence is highest in Italy and Greece; Italy consistently reports the highest average cases 761 
per year, but Greece has the highest incidence in its population, with on average 12 in 762 
100,000 Greeks reporting a case of brucellosis each year, four times more than Italians. 763 
Despite high incidence of brucellosis in Spain at the start of Atlas data records, this has 764 
generally fallen from over 200 reported cases in 2007 to only 37 cases reported in 2016. 765 
Bulgaria had an outbreak in 2015 with 36 cases, compared to the yearly average of just six. 766 
2008 had the highest number of cases of brucellosis across the EU/EEA between 2007-2016, 767 
with a total of 735 cases. That is 37% higher than the average total number of cases per year 768 
over that period. Dataset provided by ECDC based on data provided by WHO and Ministries 769 
of Health from the affected countries [10]. Figure generated using GraphPad Prism v.6.0.1. 770 
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Figure 4: Number of cases of tularaemia reported each year in the EU/EEA. Data is shown 771 
for every country with >100 total cases reported between 2008-2016. Human tularaemia is 772 
not a notifiable disease in Denmark, Portugal and Liechtenstein, however, notification is 773 
mandatory in most EU/EEA member states [16] (Fig. 4). A voluntary surveillance system is in 774 
place for Belgium and the United Kingdom [48]. Sweden reported the highest total number 775 
of cases, 3164, followed by Finland, Czech Republic, Norway and Hungary. France, Germany, 776 
Spain and Slovakia experienced much lower incidences, fewer than 1 in 100,000 cases 777 
reported each year on average. 2015 saw the highest number of reported cases of 778 
tularaemia over 2008-2016, with 64% of these occurring in Sweden. Sweden generally 779 
reported more cases each year than any other country except in 2009 when Finland saw 780 
twice its average yearly cases, and in 2016 when Finish cases reached a peak of 699, 3.6 781 
times its yearly average. In 2011 Norway also saw three times its average number of cases, 782 
affecting almost 4 in every 100,000 people. In both 2010 and 2014 Hungary experienced 783 
outbreaks with 126 and 140 reported cases, compared to the yearly average of 56. Dataset 784 
provided by ECDC based on data provided by WHO and Ministries of Health from the 785 
affected countries [10]. Figure generated using GraphPad Prism v.6.0.1.  786 
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Figure 5: Number of cases of Q fever reported each year in the EU/EEA. Data is shown for 787 
every country with >125 total cases reported between 2008-2016. The 2007-2010 Q fever 788 
epidemic was contained within southern areas of the Netherlands, affecting small ruminant 789 
farms in the direction of the prevailing wind from the affected goat farms. This accounted 790 
for 37% of the total cases of Q fever in the EU/EEA between 2008-2016, with on average 791 
1,300 cases reported per year. After this was resolved, the country with the highest 792 
prevalence of Q fever was Germany, with on average 240 cases/year between 2011-2016 793 
(incidence of 2 in 100,000), followed by France, Spain and Hungary, with 180, 110 and 60 794 
cases/year, respectively. In the six years following the epidemic resolution the Netherlands 795 
experienced a much-reduced average of 37 cases reported per year. Additionally, in 2013 796 
Hungary experienced an epidemic of 135 cases, this was resolved within two years. Dataset 797 
provided by ECDC based on data provided by WHO and Ministries of Health from the 798 
affected countries [10]. Figure generated using GraphPad Prism v.6.0.1.  799 
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Table 1: Principal routes of transmission of bacterial zoonoses. Occupational exposure 800 
relates most specifically to veterinarians, farm workers and abattoir workers. Wildlife leisure 801 
refers to hunters/hikers. 802 
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